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CHAPTER X 
LIABILITY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE 
Günther Doeker and Thomas Gehrini:; 
This chapter covers the following international agreements on liability for environmental 
damage: 
I. Liability for nuclear damage 
(117) The 1960 Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, 
and related instruments; 
(118) the 1963 Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, and related 
instruments; 
(119) the 1971 Brussels Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime 
Carriage of Nuclear Material; 
(120) the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships; 
II. Civil liability for pollution damage caused by maritime transport of oil 
( 121) the 1969 Brussels Convention on Civil Liability f or Oil Pollution Damage, and related 
instruments; 
(122) the 1971 Brussels Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, and related instruments; 
III. Civil Iiability for pollution damage caused by offshore operations 
(123) the 1977 London Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting 
from Exploration for and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources; 
IV. Civil liability for damage caused by inland transport of dangerous substances 
(124) the 1989 Geneva Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage 
of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels. 
V. Other developments concerning liability for environmental damage 
Reference is also made to current drafting work towards (a) a Protocol to the 1989 Basel 
Convention (No. 103) on liability and compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary 
movement and disposal of hazardous wastes; (b) a Council of Europe draft convention on civil 
liability for damage resulting from activities dangerous to the environment; and (c) related work 
in the U.N. International Law Commission. 
A list showing the status of ratifications as of 1 January 1992 is annexed (pages 431-435). 
https://doi.org/10.20378/irbo-51902
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International environmental conventions generally focus on so-called "ultra-hazardous" 
activities which have a number of characteristics in common: 
Activities (e.g., maritime transport of large quantities of oil, peaceful use of nuclear 
energy) are considered benign and econornically advantageous. But they involve high 
risks of accidental damage. High risk implies comparatively low probability to cause 
relatively high damage (in contrast to high probability to cause relatively minor damage). 
In view of the complexity of technologies involved or for other reasons, the risk to cause 
damage may be rninimized, but not entirely avoided. Any attempt to avoid such risks 
would result in the terrnination of the risk-creating activity. 
As long as activities are carried out, a certain economic risk of (large-scale) damage 
remains which has to allocated. 
Against this backdrop, international liability conventions try to balance two conflicting 
goals: (a) to relieve third-party victims of d.amage caused by risk-creating activities; and (b) to 
relieve operators of unnecessary obstacles in carrying out such activities. 
As a consequence, liability conventions distribute economic risks between risk-creator 
(e.g. operators or owners), third parties suffering damage, and the public; and they provide an 
internationally uniform legal framework for the regulation of liability for damage arising from 
certain activities. 
The balance between these goals varies, of course, depending upon the specific contexts 
in which conventional regimes are moulded. 
Generally, liability regi mes are determined by five principles: 
(i) Strict or absolute liability (liability regardless of fault); 
(ii) limited liability; 
(iii) channelling liability to a single clearly identifiable person; 
(iv) compulsory insurance or other financial securities limited in amount; 
(v) procedures for civil claims in competent national courts. 
These principles indicate that liability conventions are construed to allocate economic 
risks. To the extent that they allocate economic costs of activities to risk-creators, they reflect 
the Polluter-Pays Principle. Generally, the principle of (strict) liability provides an incentive to 
minimize risks; liability regimes therefore seem to have an immediate impact on environmental 
protection. In so far as they remove legal and economic constraints from industrial activities that 
are generally considered benign, they also have a direct impact on development. In balancing 
the two goals, they attempt to integrate the two important elements of environment and 
development. 
Basically, the approach of the liability regimes reviewed here provides (a) an inter-
govemmentally adopted and domestically implemented legal framework; and (b) regular 
settlement of claims below the inter-governmental level between bearers of liability, insurers and 
victims, supervised by national courts. 
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1. Liability for Nuclear Damage 
The Conventions on liability for nuclear damage balance the promotion of economic 
activities on the one hand and economic relief for victims of damage caused by such activities 
on the other. They emphasize the promotion aspect, considering that international law conceming 
nuclear liability was developed during the early 1960s, at a time when peaceful use of nuclear 
energy was at its beginnings and far from being an economically powerful industrial sector. The 
international instruments concerning nuclear liability law are closely interrelated. 
1. The Paris/Brussels Conventional Regime 
The regional Paris/Brussels conventional regime was prepared within the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). lt consists of the following instruments: 
(117) Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Paris 1960 
(Paris Convention); 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(t) 
Additional Protocol to the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy, Paris 1964; 
Protocol to Amend the Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of 
Nuclear Energy of 29 July 1960, as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 
January 1964, Paris 1982; 
Convention Supplementary to the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third 
Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy, Brussels 1963 (Brussels 
Supplementary Convention); 
Additional Protocol to the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the 
Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy, Paris 1964; 
Protocol to Amend the Convention of 31 January 1963 Supplementary to the Paris 
Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party Liability in the Field of Nuclear 
Energy as Amended by the Additional Protocol of 28 January 1964, Paris 1982. 
Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris 
Convention, Vienna 1988. 
Liability for Nuclear Darnage 395 
Objectives and achievement 
The objectives of the Paris Convention, based upon the intention to elaborate and 
harmonize Iegislation related to nuclear energy concerning third party liability, are (a) to ensure 
adequate and equitable compensation for persons suffering nuclear damage; and (b) to ensure 
that the development, the production and uses of nuclear energy are thereby not precluded. 
Unlike the regimes concerning carriage of dangerous substances and oil pollution (Nos. 97-98 
and 100 below), the Paris Convention emphasizes the priority to develop nuclear energy 
production as compared to the relief of victims. Accordingly, it provides the following liability 
regime: 
The operator of a nuclear installation shall be strictly and exclusively liable for nuclear 
damage (Art. 3). All other persons involved, e.g. suppliers or carriers, are relieved from 
any liability whatsoever (Art. 6). 
Liability of the operator shall be covered by insurance or financial security (Art. 10). 
Liability is limited in time to ten years from the occurrence of an incident (Art. 8) and 
in amount to 15 million European Units of Account (EUA, equivalent to gold-based US 
dollars) (subsequently amended) per incident (Art. 7). Domestic laws may provide other 
limits, but the amount may not fall below 5 million EUA (later amended) (Art. 15). 
Action shall be brought in a competent court in the state in which the installation is 
situated (Art. 13). 
Parties may adopt additional measures concerning various aspects. 
Within the limits relating to time and amount of compensation, the regime establishes a 
victim-oriented liability regime, while at the same time channelling economic risks to one easily 
identifiable person and relieving industry from covering multiple risks by insurance. However, 
amounts of compensation are in no way related to anticipated costs caused by severe nuclear 
incidents. To stabilize the "channelling" rule and the exclusive liability of the operator of a 
nuclear installation, additional funds had tobe provided. 
The sole objective of the Brussels Supplementary Convention is to supplement the 
measures adopted in the Paris Convention by increasing the amounts of compensation available 
(cf. preamble). The Supplementary Convention establishes a three-tier compensation system: 
The basis is provided by the operator's liability according to national legislation and the 
Paris conventional regime. Compensation must not be less than EUA 5 million 
(subsequently amended). 
An additional layer raises the amount available for compensation up to a total of EUA 
70 million (subsequently amended). lt is financed from public funds of the Party in the 
territory of which the damage-prone installation is situated. 
A third layer brings the compensation available up to a total of EUA 120 million 
(subsequently amended). lt is financed by public funds through the community of 
Contracting Parties (Art. 8). 
Public funds of the second and third layers are subject to the same claims procedures as 
private funds; in practice, the court competent under the Paris Convention allocates funds 
available under the Brussels Supplementary Convention (Art. 9). 
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Contributions to the third layer are calculated in proportion to gross national products of 
the Parties (50%) and in proportion to the aggregate thermal power of reactors situated 
in the territory of Parties (Art. 12). 
The 1964 Protocols do not in substance modify the interrelated regime. lt was the 
objective of the 1964 Additional Protocol to the Paris Convention to adapt the regional Paris 
Convention to the regime of the global Vienna Convention, adopted in 1963 within IAEA (see 
No. 118 below) to allow simultaneous participation in both instruments. Similarly, the 1964 
Additional Protocol to the Brussels Supplementary Convention adapts the latter instrument to a 
slightly modified Paris Convention. 
The 1982 Protocols incorporate a number of interpretations adopted by the Contracting 
Parties and introduce two modifications of the regime. They replace the European Unit of 
Account, which was based on the gold-based US-dollar, by the Special Drawing Right (SDR) 
of the International Monetary Fund as principal unit of account. Accordingly, the 1982 Protocol 
to the Paris Convention adjusts the amount of liability on behalf of the operator at SDR 15 
million, but not less than SDR 5 million. At the same time, the 1982 Protocol to the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention raised the compensation limits of the second and third layers to SDR 
175 million and SDR 300 million respectively. 
The Paris/Brussels regime integrates environmental and developmental aspects of the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, although priority is placed upon the latter. Due to low limitation 
amounts (as compared to the anticipated costs of a major incident), it might have only an indirect 
influence on environmental protection. Moreover, it does not provide for compensation for 
measures designed to prevent damage. 
Participation in the Paris/Brussels regime is currently limited to Western Europe. lt does 
not take into account the special situation of developing countries. Nevertheless, since it was the 
first international regime on liability for nuclear damage, the Paris Convention heavily influenced 
the development of domestic laws concerning nuclear liability all over the world. Its general 
approach was incorporated, with only minor modifications, into the global Vienna Convention 
(No. 94). Accordingly, it introduced internationally applied standards concerning liability for a 
type of ultra-hazardous activities. 
One objective of the Conventions, namely the creation of a uniform law of liability for 
nuclear damage, has been achieved far beyond their regional territorial application. The intention 
to provide uniformity of law to remove obstacles for the development of new sources of energy 
proved to be successful. There has been no serious attempt to modify the basic principles of the 
Paris/Brussels conventional regime. 
As far as the provision of "adequate and equitable" compensation is concerned, the result 
is more ambiguous. No serious nuclear incident has occurred in the territorial jurisdiction of the 
Conventions to test the compensation mechanism. There is no doubt that compensation limits are 
low. They were not increased in light of growing economic risks involved in the exploitation of 
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, or growing economic capabilities of nuclear and insurance 
industries in Western Europe. As a consequence of modifications introduced by the 1982 
Protocols, the part of compensation financed by public funds increased significantly, while the 
part of privately financed compensation was allowed to decrease. In proportion many 
Contracting Parties provide by domestic law compensation far beyond the limits of the first two 
layers of the interrelated regime; e.g., Germany provides for unlimited operators' Iiability, with 
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DM 500 million (approximately SDR 200 million) to be covered by private insurance and 
insurance pools, and another DM 500 million provided by public funds. The OECD Steering 
Committee for Nuclear Energy recommended in 1990 to adjust operators' liability to SDR 150 
million, ten times that provided for by the Paris Convention1• As a consequence, the authority 
of the Paris Convention as reliable guide in matters of nuclear liability seems at risk of being 
gradually undermined, while the Brussels Supplementary scheme may lose its relevance owing 
to high national standards. 
Participation 
The Paris Convention is regional in scope. lt was elaborated within OECD (then OEEC). 
The first paragraph of the preamble expressly mentions as signatories to the Convention 
seventeen European members of OECD. Other member countries of OECD and States 
associated with that organization may join the Convention. However, States that are neither 
signatories nor members of or associated with OECD may become members by unanimous 
assent of the Contracting Parties (in fact, the USSR was invited to join, in the course of a G-7 
meeting in Tokyo). Participation in the Brussels Supplementary Convention depends upon 
participation in the Paris Convention. Yet, non-signatories to the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention may accede only upon unanimous assent of Contracting Parties. The various 
Protocols do not introduce other procedures. 
Under both the Paris and Brussels Supplernentary Conventions, reservations to one or 
more provisions may be made by a Party at any time prior to its ratification or accession. Yet, 
reservations are admissible only in case they have been expressly accepted by the Signatories. 
The Paris Convention, as amended, is accompanied by five accepted reservations, which are 
applicable to several Parties. 
The Paris Convention is in force for 14 Parties which are exclusively European members 
of OECD. 11 of these States are also members of the Brussels Supplementary Convention. 
Developing countries neither attended negotiations nor joined the Conventions at a later date. 
In light of the existence of the Vienna Convention (No. 118), there has been no attempt to 
encourage developing countries to participate. 
Participation of countries in the Paris Convention was, without doubt, influenced by the 
conviction that the limits of compensation provided were insurable and could be covered by 
operators. With respect to private operators, States would not incur any costs. 
The decision to participate in the Brussels Supplementary Convention was primarily based 
on the desire to remove possible obstacles to the development of nuclear power, provided that 
compensation by public funds was limited to a reasonable arnount. US-based suppliers of nuclear 
technology had indicated they rnight stop supply due to compensation amounts that were too low 
to preclude claims under regular (i.e. non-nuclear) US liability laws. Therefore, it appears that 
the decision to participate may to a significant degree be attributed to the influence of industrial 
non-governmental organizations. 
1 See (OECD) Nuclear Law Bulletin No. 45/1990, p. 75. 
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Reservations contributed to flexibility without over-burdening the treaty regime with 
exemptions of interest only to a limited number of Parties concerned. However, since 
reservations cannot be made unilaterally, they are subject to negotiation and form part of the 
overall compromise commonly adopted. 
Implementation and information 
The Paris Convention entered into force upon deposit of the fifth ratification, in April 
1968. However, as its primary purpose was the unification of national laws on nuclear liability, 
its incorporation into domestic legal systems did not depend upon its formal entry into force. The 
Brussels Supplementary Convention required six ratifications. lt seems evident that fund schemes 
require a minimum participation number to become operative in order to distribute the economic 
risks involved. Despite the late entry into force of the Brussels Supplementary Convention 
(December 1974), the requirement appears not to have been overly restrictive. 
The 1964 Protocols provide for simultaneous ratification of Conventions and their 
respective Protocols. They were thus incorporated into the regular ratification process. 
According to the Paris Convention, the 1982 Protocol entered into force in October 1988 upon 
ratification by two-thirds of the Parties. However, according to the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention, amendments require "agreement" by Parties, i.e., the 1982 Protocol required 
ratification by all Parties to the Convention. The fact that the Protocol entered into force only 
in August 1991 may be attributed to this strict requirement. Both Protocols of 1982 stipulate that 
Parties are under an obligation to undertake ratification of the respective instruments as soon as 
possible. While the intention of the clause seems to be clear, its effect remains doubtful. 
Under the Paris Convention, Parties are primarily obliged to implement the regime on 
nuclear liability into national law. lt includes provisions for jurisdiction of courts, enforcement 
of judgements of foreign courts, and application of the Convention without discrimination as to 
nationality or residence. Likewise, Parties to the Brussels Supplementary Convention are 
primarily obliged to incorporate regulations concerning additional compensation into domestic 
law. 
Compliance concerning obligations of the interrelated conventional regime can only be 
monitored by assessment of domestic laws on nuclear liability. While the Conventions do not 
provide for supervisory mechanisms, the OECD Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) as responsible 
parent organization for the Paris Convention carefully follows up and provides information on 
developments in domestic nuclear laws. 
According to the Brussels Supplementary Convention, Parties shall submit a list of all 
installations for peaceful uses of nuclear energy and update these lists as appropriate. Moreover, 
in case of nuclear incidents, Parties shall communicate early information about the incident and 
have to make available public funds for compensation. Yet, as of now, no such incident has 
occurred. No other obligations as to data disclosure exist. 
Promotion of compliance largely depends upon consultations within the NEA-Steering 
~ommittee on Nuclear Energy. The Steering Committee also promotes rapid ratification of 
mstruments that are adopted and signed. 
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Beside informal consultation in the Steering Committee, the Brussels Supplementary 
Convention institutes a formal procedure with regard to objections concerning lists of nuclear 
installations submitted by the Parties. Parties may notify such protests to the depositary (the 
Belgian Government) within three months upon submission of the list concerned. Any (other) 
disputes arising between two or more Parties to either of the Conventions shall be submitted to 
the European Nuclear Energy Tribunal. However, as of now, no dispute has been brought before 
the Tribunal. 
The texts of all instruments are widely disseminated in English and French by OECD. 
The principal vehicle for the dissemination of information on the operation and implementation 
of Conventions, as well as on domestic laws or nuclear third party liability in general, is the 
Nuclear Law Bulletin published twice a year by NEA in the working languages of OECD. lt 
closely follows law-making and implementation processes and reproduces texts of new 
instruments, decisions and recommendations prepared and adopted by the OECD/NEA Steering 
Committee, etc. Decisions and recommendations of the Steering Committee interpreting the 
Paris Convention have been compiled in a bilingual booklet re-issued in 1990. Most recently, 
OECD/NEA issued a study of domestic and international nuclear liability laws under the title 
"Nuclear Legislation: Third Party Liability" (Paris 1990). 
NEA and OECD have also repeatedly organized symposia addressing specific issues of 
international nuclear liability laws. The proceedings are published. 
Operation, review and adjustment 
While the OECD performs depositary functions for the Paris Convention, the Belgian 
Government performs depositary functions for the Brussels Supplementary Convention. Neither 
the Paris nor the Brussels Supplementary Conventions or any of the Protocols establish a 
separate institutional mechanism, but instead rely on the institutional mechanism of the parent 
organization. Within the framework of OECD/NEA, there exists a Steering Committee for 
Nuclear Energy composed of government representatives, which meets regularly, and which has 
established a permanent subsidiary body, the Group of Govemmental Experts on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy. Through these bodies, the provisions of the Paris 
Convention are subject to continuous review and interpretation. Although the institutional 
mechanism of NEA is not formally responsible for the Brussels Supplementary Convention, in 
fact it fully includes the latter instrument in its monitoring and review process. 
There are no institutionalized mechanisms for bringing scientific and technical advise into 
the decision-making process. With regard to the Paris regime, co-operation between States and 
industries concemed has been, and still is, close, especially with associations representing 
insurers and electric power producers. By contrast, there is no participation of environmental 
NGOs in relevant international fora, in particular in the Steering Committee and its subsidiary 
body. 
The Paris Convention provides for a review conference five years after entry into force. 
In the Brussels Supplementary Convention there is no provision for such a review. In practice, 
however, both instruments are under continuous review within the Steering Committee and the 
Group of Governmental Experts. 
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Neither Convention stipulates provisions for regular review of compensation limits and 
their adaptation to changing conditions. Each modification of compensation figures is subject to 
a time-consuming ad hoc amendment and ratification process. 
Codification programming 
Currently, no drafts or revisions of existing instruments are under preparation at the 
regional level. Future work by Paris/Brussels Convention Parties within the framework of 
NEA/OECD has to be closely coordinated with parallel work proceeding within IAEA. lt may 
be expected that the Paris/Brussels regime will have to be adapted to results achieved at the 
global level. 
Co-ordination between the regional and the global level is accomplished by close co-
operation between the two secretariats concerned (NEA and IAEA), and by participation of 
Paris/Brussels Convention Parties in proceedings at the global level. In fact it has been attempted 
to integrate the two parallel liability regimes through adoption of a Joint Protocol (see No. 94/b 
below). 
Two principal gaps exist in the Paris/Brussels scheme. The regime lacks institutional 
flexibility, whereas more recently adopted instruments concerning other ultra-hazardous activities 
frequently contain simplified amendment procedures for rapid adaptation of provisions to 
changing circumstances. This is particularly relevant with respect to changes of amounts of 
liability and compensation. 
The Paris/Brussels regime does not compensate for expenditures incurred for preventive 
measures. Since compensation depends on clear causal evidence, successful preventive measures 
may interrupt the causal chain. The "Chernobyl" incident made clear that beyond the borders 
of the country in whose territory an incident occurs, costs arise primarily with regard to 
preventive measures. Ways of incorporating such measures into the compensation scheme are 
now being considered. 
Due to the institutional inflexibility of the Paris/Brussels regime, decisions or 
recommendations of the NEA Steering Committee or the OECD Council gain relevance for the 
development of internationally co-ordinated nuclear liability laws. If implemented into domestic 
laws, they may - to a certain extent - replace amendments of formal legal instruments. 
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2. The Vienna Convention 
The regime consists of three instruments: 
(118) the Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, 1963; 
(a) the Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Vienna 
1963; 
(b) the Joint Protocol Relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the 
Paris Convention, Vienna 1988. 
Objectives and achievement 
The Vienna Convention, which is global in scope, primarily establishes minimum 
standards providing financial protection against damage resulting from nuclear installations. In 
this way, the Convention was intended to contribute to the development of friendly relations 
between countries with differing constitutional and social systems (preamble). Unlike the Paris 
Convention (No. 117 above), it does not address the issue of adequacy or equitableness of 
compensation. However, the liabi\ity regime of the Vienna Convention resembles closely that 
of the regional Paris Convention: 
Operators of nuclear installations shall be absolutely and exclusively liable for nuclear 
damage (Arts. II, IV). 
They shall cover their liability by financial security, e.g., insurance. However operators 
that are States or their constituent parts (regional entities) shall not be required to hold 
insurance cover. Licensing States shall ensure payment of compensation beyond the yield 
of insurance (Art. VII). 
Liability may be limited in amount, but to no less than gold-based US$ 5 million, and 
in time to no less than 10 years from the occurrence of an incident (Art. V). 
Action shall be brought in a competent court in the installation state (Art. XI). 
An important objective of the Vienna Convention was to facilitate the development of 
nuclear programmes, i.e., of ultra-hazardous activities, in member countries. The Convention 
balances the promotion of industrial development (developing a uniform and widely recognized 
law of liability for nuclear damage) and environmental protection (relieving victims from 
economic costs of nuclear damage). 
The Convention does not expressly address the special situation of developing countries. 
However, the cost-effective element of the regime, i.e. the minimum amount of compensation, 
has been adjusted in view of the participation of developing countries at a lower figure as 
compared to the Paris/Brussels regime (No. 117 above) and to the Nuclear Ship Convention (No. 
120 below). 
The Vienna Convention has, as a concomitant to the Paris Convention, contributed to 
promoting uniform laws on liability for nuclear damage. However, its effect remained limited 
because only 14 States are party to the Convention, several of which do not have any nuclear 
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programme. At present, the Convention is applicable only to 8 existing reactors and four under 
construction, whereas the Paris Convention applies to 153 existing installations and 13 under 
construction 2• 
Participation 
The Vienna Convention is open for signature and subsequent ratification by States 
represented at the International Conference on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Vienna 1963. 
Accession is possible for the rnembers of the United Nations, its specialized agencies or the 
IAEA. 
The Convention does not address the issue of reservations. 
Currently3, the Convention is in force for 14 countries, namely Argentina, Bolivia, 
Cameroon, Chile, Cuba, Egypt, Hungary, Mexico, Niger, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Trinidad 
& Tobago and Yugoslavia. No member of the Paris Convention as of now has ratified the 
Vienna Convention. 
The Convention was prepared by an Intergovernmental Committee attended by 
representatives from seven Western industrialized countries (four European, three others), three 
Eastern European industrialized countries, and four developing countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
India and Egypt). The Diplomatie Conference that adopted the Convention was attended by 58 
delegations of which 29 were from industrialized countries (18 from Western Europe, 6 from 
Eastern Europe, and 5 others), whereas 25 represented developing countries (9 from Asia, 10 
from Arnerica, 3 from Africa, and 4 from Europe); two additional developing countries were 
represented by observers4 • 
No regular meetings or programrne activities are envisaged. However, within the 
framework of IAEA, a Standing Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage was 
established that met occasionally to discuss issues relevant to the Convention. lt was composed 
of 15 States, including 5 developing and 10 industrialized countries. Lirnitations conceming 
participation were removed as the Committee was transformed into an open-ended negotiation 
forum with a broader mandate. Currently, about sixty delegations from both developing and 
industrialized countries as well as non-governmental organizations attend its sessions. 
The principal benefit for all countries participating in the Convention, including 
developing countries, is the right of their nationals to claim compensation in case of nuclear 
damage caused by installations situated in a Contracting Party. Currently, the minimum amount 
of compensation is subject to review and subsequent adaptation; the benefit may be expected to 
substantially increase in the near future. 
2 
Figures from Status of nuclear installations as of 31 December 1990; IAEA Bulletin 1/1991, p. 43. 
3 As of 1 January 1992. 
• 
4 
Figures from: International Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Legal Series No. 4, 
V1enna 1976. 
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Participation in the Convention does not depend on technical and scientific assistance. 
However, IAEA may provide legal assistance if requested. In case of countries without nuclear 
programmes, participation does not imply any financial obligations. 
Implementation and information 
Tue Convention entered into force three months after the deposit of the fifth instrument 
of ratification (Article XXXII). This requirement appears not to have been overly ambitious, 
even though it took 14 years until the Convention entered into force on 12 November 1977. 
Obligations imposed upon Parties extend primarily to implementation of the regime set 
out in the Convention. States Parties ensure the payment of compensation in case they do not 
provide for insurance of the operator or beyond the yield of such insurance and up to the 
operator's liability. Parties shall provide for necessary jurisdictional competences, and recognize 
final judgements entered by foreign courts in accordance with the Convention. They shall not 
invoke immunities in legal proceedings under the Convention. There is no systematic monitoring 
of implementation. Parties do not regularly report about implementation and do not have to 
disclose or supply data. 
While the Convention has no rules concerning the settlement of disputes, the 1963 
Conference adopted a Protocol Concerning Compulsory Settlement of Disputes. The Protocol 
is optional and subject to ratification. lt enters into force upon the second ratification. As of 
now, only one ratification has been deposited. 
The Convention was drafted and published in four languages, English, French, Spanish, 
and Russian5• Travaux preparatoires have been published in English6 , French, Spanish and 
Russian. 
Operation, review and adjustment 
The Director-General of IAEA is the depositary. The Convention does not provide for 
institutional or administrative arrangements. There are no regular meetings and programmes. In 
consequence, no costs of attendance or administration are incurred by Parties under the 
Convention. 
While there are no separate mechanisms under the Convention for the regular review of 
provisions or consideration of scientific and technical information, the Board of Govemors of 
IAEA may decide, and has decided, specific minor technical issues. Pursuant to Article XXV, 
a review conference shall be convened by the Director General of IAEA upon request by at least 
one-third of the Contracting Parties any time after the expiry of five years from entry into force 
of the Convention (i.e. since 1982). As of now, no such conference has taken place, but a 
review conference may be called in 1992. 
5 International Conventions on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, IAEA Legal Series No. 4, Vienna 1966. 
6 Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, Official Records, International Conference, Vienna, 29 April - 19 May 
1963, IAEA Legal Series No. 2, Vienna 1964. 
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Beside the arrangements provided for under the Convention, the IAEA Standing 
Committee on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage provided an arena for deliberations conceming 
the Convention. With respect to the current review of the Vienna Convention, the mandate of 
the Committee, renamed "Standing Committee on Liability for Nuclear Damage", was extended 
to include international liability matters. 
Codification programming 
The Chernobyl incident dramatically demonstrated that neither the regime of the Vienna 
Convention nor its geographical scope are satisfactory. Since 1987, a review of all aspects of 
international law on liability for nuclear damage has been instituted within the framework of the 
IAEA. The first stage of this work Jed to the adoption in 1988 of the Joint Protocol Relating 
to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the Paris Convention. With regard to the 
revision of the Vienna Convention, major issues under consideration concern the following: a 
revision of the limitations of liability of the Vienna Convention, with regard to the minimum 
amount of compensation, the period of time within which compensation may be claimed, and 
the exclusion of compensation for preventive measures. The Standing Committee has also 
addressed an evaluation of possibilities for introducing additional compensation, such as the 
compensation provided by the Brussels Supplementary Convention in addition to liability of the 
operator under the Paris Convention (No. 93). Supplementary layers of compensation may 
either be incorporated into the Yienna conventional regime or in a new draft instrument. Issues 
of State responsibility and liability are also under consideration. 
The review and revision process of the Vienna Convention, and the drafting of some 
possible new mechanism has to be closely related to developments proceeding within 
OECD/NEA in respect of the Paris/Brussels conventional regime. Drafting is coordinated 
through close relations between the two international organizations, i.e. OECD/NEA and IAEA, 
and through participation of Paris/Brussels Convention Parties in the current deliberation process 
within IAEA. Measures adopted at the global level may require subsequent adaptation of the 
regional Paris/Brussels conventional regirne. 
Developments in international law have been influenced by developments at the domestic 
level. Domestic laws extend the scope of liability far beyond the minimum standards contained 
in international conventions. Therefore, the current revision of the Vienna Convention attempts 
to re-establish a higher degree of international uniformity of nuclear liability laws. 
Liability for Nuclear Damage 405 
3. The Joint Protocol relating to the Application of the Vienna Convention and the 
Paris Convention, Vienna 1988. 
Objectives and achievement 
Third party liability for nuclear damage from stationary sources is governed by two 
regimes that are, even though similar in approach, independent from each other. One lesson that 
can be drawn from "Chernobyl" accident is that the two regimes should be merged. 
Accordingly, the objective of the Joint Protocol is to establish a link between the Vienna and 
Paris Conventions. Such an approach appears to be unique. A single Protocol, signed by the 
Parties to both regimes, is intended to amend both Conventions at the same time. lt provides that 
an operator situated in a country participating in the Paris Convention shall be liable (also) for 
damage suffered in the territory of a Party to the Vienna Convention, if it has acceded to the 
Joint Protocol; and vice versa. 
Since the Joint Protocol has been adopted only recently (1988), it is not yet clear whether 
it will meet its objective. To a large extent, its success will depend upon increasing acceptance 
of the Vienna Convention by Eastern European countries having nuclear programmes. The 
number of ratifications, in particular by countries with nuclear installations, will indicate its 
success. 
Participation 
Participation is limited to Parties to the Paris and Vienna Conventions. 
Currently, 22 States have signed the Joint Protocol, including 14 Parties and one 
additional signatory to the Paris Convention (Western Europe) and 6 Parties to the Vienna 
Convention (5 developing countries and one East European country). As Oof now7 10 countries 
have deposited their instruments of ratification, accession or approval, including 5 participants 
of the Paris Convention, and 5 participants of the Vienna Convention, among them two Bast 
European industrialized States and 3 developing countries. 
The issue of reservations is not addressed in the Protocol. 
Negotiations proceeded within IAEA and were open to all countries. At the time of 
negotiations (1987), developing countries were the only Contracting Parties of the Vienna 
Convention. 
Implementation and information 
Having received the required ten ratifications (five from each Convention), the Joint 
Protocol will enter into force on 27 April 1992. 
Obligations imposed upon Parties extend to a revision of their domestic nuclear liability 
laws. The Protocol does not include any reporting obligation. There is no provision on 
supervision. 
7 l January 1992. 
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Promotion of compliance and dispute settlement depends upon the institutional 
mechanisms of the two Conventions and their respective parent organizations. 
While the Joint Protocol does not address the Brussels Supplementary Convention 
compensation scheme, the territorial extension of the operators' private liability under the Paris 
Convention may result in earlier application of the additional compensation scheme. 
Implementation by Parties to the Paris Convention that are also Parties to the Brussels 
Supplementary Convention may therefore also depend upon accommodation of obligations 
between the Contracting Parties of the latter Convention. 
The Protocol was issued in the six working languages of the United Nations; it has been 
widely disseminated in English and French through the Nuclear Law Bulletin. No additional 
information is available except that produced and disseminated under the two conventional 
regimes. 
Operation, review and adjustment 
The Joint Protocol is deposited with the Director General of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. lt does not provide for any secretariat, administration or regular meetings. 
The Protocol has no mechanism for review, nor does an amendment clause exist. Policy-
making and review functions will be discharged under the two Conventions. 
Codification programming 
Within the current process of reviewing and revising of the Vienna Convention, one or 
more additional systems of compensation supplementary to the private liability of the operator 
of a nuclear installation may be introduced. In consequence, the Paris and Vienna Conventions 
may be supplemented by a single regime of additional compensation in the future. 
However, the Joint Protocol emphasizes that policy-making in either of the two regimes 
is of concem for Parties to the other regime. Until formal institutional structures are developed, 
mutual participation and close cooperation are of major importance. 
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4. Maritime Transport of Nuclear Material 
(119) Convention Relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear 
Material, Brussels 1971. 
Objectives and achievement 
Both the Paris and the Vienna Convention "channel" liability for nuclear damage to 
operators of nuclear installations. Damage occurring during transport is usually attributed to the 
sending and, in some cases, to the receiving installation. However, both Conventions do not 
interfere with existing conventions of traditional maritime law. Accordingly, during maritime 
carriage of nuclear material parallel liabilities may arise: strict but limited liability of the 
operator of the nuclear installation concernecl under nuclear law, and traditional fault liability 
of the carrier under maritime law. In certain cases, this latter liability may be unlimited. In 
consequence, maritime insurers did not cover nuclear risks, and maritime carriers refused to 
accept nuclear cargo. 
The objective of the Maritime Carriage Convention is to ensure that Operators of nuclear 
installations are exclusively liable for nuclear damage caused during maritime transport of 
nuclear material. lt provides that any person that might be liable under national or international 
maritime law shall be exonerated from liability if the operator of a nuclear installation is liable 
either under international nuclear law (Paris or Vienna Conventions, Nos. 93 and 94 above), or 
under national nuclear law provided that national law is in all aspects as favourable to victims 
as the relevant international conventions. 
Like the Joint Protocol, the Maritime Carriage Convention bridges an existing gap 
between parallel legal systems. lt does not establish an independent liability regime. 
The underlying objective of the Convention, namely the removal of obstacles to maritime 
carriage of nuclear material, has been successful only to a limited degree. Most ratifications have 
been deposited by Western European States, i.e. Paris Convention States. Generally, interest in 
the Convention remained low. The general principle, however, namely the separation of nuclear 
and maritime liability, gradually enters instruments of maritime law. 
Participation 
Participation follows the "Vienna formula", i.e. participation is limited to members of 
the United Nations, its specialized organizations, IAEA and the Statute of the ICJ. 
Reservations are possible upon ratification, accession or approval in case they have been 
made according to the requirements of the Paris and Vienna Conventions. Of the 13 Contracting 
Parties, only Germany made a reservation. 
The current membership is as follows: 10 Parties from Western Europe, and 4 Parties 
that are developing countries. 
Whereas the instrument was prepared within OECD/NEA and the Comite Maritime 
International (CMI), an association of shipping interests, it was drafted within the IMCO Legal 
Committee and adopted by an IMCO Diplomatie Conference. The IMCO meetings were attended 
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by a considerably higher number of delegations, including developing countries. 38 States were 
represented at the Diplomatie Conference that adopted the Convention, including 19 from 
developing countries (6 from America, 6 from Asia, 5 from Africa, and 2 from Europe), and 
19 industrialized countries (15 from Western Europe and 4 Others). In addition, five developing 
countries were represented by observer delegations8 • 
The Maritime Carriage Convention is in fact an instrument for joint amendment of 
nuclear liability conventions and several maritime liability conventions; no other programme 
activities are therefore foreseen. Two groups of States benefit from participation: States with 
nuclear power programmes benefit from being able to transport nuclear material by sea; and 
maritime countries enable their commercial fleet to accept nuclear cargo. 
Implementation and information 
The Convention required the deposit of five ratifications, accessions or approvals for its 
entry into force, on 15 July 1975. 
The Convention obliges Parties to implement relevant provisions into national nuclear and 
maritime law. lt does not provide for organized monitoring or data reporting. However, despite 
its being part of international maritime law, it is of interest primarily for the development of 
nuclear energy. lt is, therefore, subject in particular to NEA nuclear law supervisory activities. 
There are no institutional mechanisms for the promotion of compliance or for the 
settlement of disputes. 
The text of the Convention has been published by IMO in four languages (English, 
French, Russian, and Spanish), accompanied by the Final Act of the relevant Conference. 
Although it is administered by IMO, information largely relies upon NEA activities, 
including reports in the Nuclear Law Bulletin. 
Operation, review and adjustment 
The Secretary-General of IMO performs depositary functions under the Convention. The 
Convention does not provide for the establishment of a secretariat or the conduct of regular 
meetings or programme activities. 
The depositary organization shall call a conference for revision of the instrument upon 
request of one third of the Parties. This provision has not been applied so far. Since the 
Convention does not establish an independent liability regime, it does not require continuous 
adaptation to changing circumstances. 
8 
Final Act of the International Legal Conference on Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Substances 1971. 
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Codification programming 
As far as the international regulation of maritime carriage of nuclear material is 
concerned, new draft instruments or draft revisions are not under consideration. However, the 
concept of separation of nuclear and maritime liability is incorporated in an ongoing process of 
continuous incorporation into revised or new instruments of international maritime law, e.g., the 
Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims, London 1976. 
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5. Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships 
(120) Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, Brussels 1962. 
Objectives and achievement 
The launching of the first nuclear-powered freighter made it apparent that commercial 
competitiveness relied on the principle that coastal states generally accept the calling of such 
ships in ports under their territorial jurisdiction. At the same time, an increasing number of 
nuclear-powered ships, including warships, raised the risks of large-scale (nuclear) damage, for 
which commercial shipping was liable according to traditional maritime law. 
The objective of the Nuclear Ship Convention is, therefore, to determine by agreement 
uniform rules concerning the liability of operators of nuclear ships (preamble). For this purpose, 
the Convention establishes the following regime: 
The operator shalI be absolutely liable for nuclear damage caused by the operation of a 
nuclear ship. Other persons shall be exonerated from any liability that might arise under 
any other law (Art. II). 
Liability shall be limited to 1500 million gold-based francs (approximately gold-based 
US$ 100 million) (Art. III). 
The licensing State shall determine the amount up to which the Operator shall be obliged 
to cover his liability by insurance. The licensing State shall ensure the availability of the 
füll amount of compensation by providing the necessary funds beyond the yield of such 
insurance (Art. III). 
The regime extends to any nuclear-propelled ship, including warships (Art. I). 
Action for compensation may be brought in a court of the licensing State or of any 
Contracting Party in whose territory damage is sustained. However, in case the limitation 
amount does not satisfy all claims, or the ship causing nuclear damage is a warship, the 
competent court shall be that of the licensing State (Arts. X, XI). 
With reference to the operation of nucJear-propelled ships being commercially used, the 
Convention attempts to effective!y integrate environmental and developmental aspects. Without 
the existence of a sufficiently effective liability regime, coastal States would not accept the 
entrance of nuclear-propelled vessels in their waters and ports. With regard to economic risks 
involved in new and ultra-hazardous industrial activities, the responsibility of Parties creating 
and being in a position to minimize such risks (i.e„ operators and licensing states), protects 
possible victims and removes obstacles to such activities. 
The Convention has not been successful as it never entered into force. Two factors 
contributed to its failure: States with nuclear-propelled warships refused to accept the application 
of a conventional regime based on private-liability to warships, and nuclear propulsion turned 
out not to be economically competitive. 
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Participation 
The Convention is open for signature and subsequent ratification by States having 
attended the 1962 Diplomatie Conference on Maritime Law. Members of the United Nations, 
its specialized agencies and the IAEA may accede to it. 
The Convention has been signed by 15 States, including five European industrialized 
countries and ten developing countries (6 Asian, 2 African, 1 American, 1 European). lt has 
been ratified by two West-European States and acceded to by 2 developing countries9 • 
The Convention had been prepared within the Comite Maritime International, the private 
association of shipping interests on maritime law, and the IAEA. The relevant CMI session was 
not attended by any national shipping association from developing countries and only one from 
Eastern Europe10 • The IAEA "Panel of Legal Experts" was attended by members from the 
following regional groups: Western Europe (10), Eastern Europe (5); other industrialized 
countries (3); developing countries (4), of which three from Europe plus lndia11 • The eleventh 
session of the Diplomatie Conference on Maritime Law (first phase) was attended by delegations 
from 49 countries, including 30 from industrialized countries (18 West-European, 7 East-
European, 5 others) and 19 from developing countries (8 Asian, 4 African, 3 American, 4 
European) plus 8 observer delegations from developing countries. Of the 50 delegations that 
attended the second phase of the Conference, 28 represented industrialized countries (17 West-
European, 7 East-European, 4 others) and 22 developing countries (8 Asian, 4 African, 6 
American, 4 European). Out of five observer delegations, three represented developing and two 
industrialized countries12 • 
Until nuclear propulsion of commercial ships becomes more widespread, or until States 
operating nuclear-propelled ships accept application of a civil liability regime to ships in non-
commercial service, including warships, no incentive for further participation is apparent. 
Implementation and information 
To enter into force, the Convention requires the deposit of two ratifications, including 
at least one ratification by a licensing state. The requirement reflects the very minimum 
condition making the conventional regime applicable at least between two States and for at least 
one nuclear-propelled ship. However, to date no licensing State ratified the Convention. 
9 Cf. Nuclear Law Bulletin 13/1974, p. 32-33. 
10 International Maritime Committee XXIVth Conference - Rijeka 1959. 
11 Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, Report of the Panel of Legal Experts; Doc. No. 3, Diplomatie 
Conference on Maritime Law, Brussels 1961. Panel members were mostly governmental experts, but acted in a 
personal capacity. 
12 Cf. Royaume de Belgique, Ministere des affaires etrangeres et du commerce exterieur: Confärence 
Diplomatique de Droit Maritime, Onzieme Session, Bruxelles 1961, Brussels 1962; and Royaume de Belgique, 
Ministere des affaires etrangeres et du commerce exterieur: Confärence Diplomatique de Droit Maritime, Onzieme 
Session (2e phase), Bruxelles 1962, Brussels 1963. 
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Obligations imposed upon Parties extend primarily to incorporating the liability regime into 
domestic legislation. The regime includes provisions for the supply by licensing States of public 
funds beyond the yield of private insurance of operators in case of nuclear damage, necessary 
jurisdictional provisions, the waiving of immunity as far as the conventional regime is 
concemed, and the undertaking of appropriate measures to prevent nuclear ships from flying 
flags of Contracting States without their licence or authority. 
The Convention does not provide for monitoring. There are no obligations as to data 
reporting, compliance and follow-up on non-cornpliance. Disputes between two or more Parties 
shall be submitted to arbitration, if they cannot be settled by negotiation. If, within six months, 
the Parties concerned are unable to agree on arbitration procedures, any one of them may refer 
the dispute to the International Court of Justice. Upon signature, ratification or accession, a 
Party may declare that it does not consider itself bound by the dispute-settlement mechanism. 
The mechanism has not been used. 
The text of the Convention was drafted in four languages, English, French, Russian, and 
Spanish. Proceedings of the 11 th Session of the Diplomatie Conferences on Maritime Law were 
published by the depositary, the Government of Belgium. The published proceedings reproduce 
documents in English and French, as submitted, and other documents in (French) translation. 
Operation, review and adjustment 
The Convention is deposited with the Belgian Government. It does not provide for 
institutional mechanisms, nor is it related to an existing international organization. The 
Depositary Government shall convene conferences for the purpose of revising the Convention 
five years after its entry into force or upon request of one-third of the Contracting Parties. 
Codification programming 
Currently no draft instruments or draft revisions of the Convention are in preparation. 
Unless nuclear-propelled and commercial vessels become operative and economically 
competitive, the international legal regime on liability for nuclear damage caused by these ships 
does not have much relevance. 
Although the Conventiön did not enter into force, its liability regime served as model for 
a number of bilateral port-visit arrangements concerning two nuclear-powered carriers, namely 
Savannah (USA) and Otto Hahn (Germany). To facilitate and to guide time-consuming bilateral 
negotiations, the OECD- Nuclear Energy Agency elaborated a "Model for Bilateral Agreements 
on the Visits of Nuclear Ships" 13, which contributed to the development of international law 
concerning liability of operators of nuclear ships. 
13 Cf. Nuclear Law Bulletin 12/1973, pp. 31-37. 
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The regime concerning civil liability for pollution damage caused by maritime transport 
of oil consists of the following interrelated instruments: 
(121) the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels 
1969 (CLC); 
(a) the Protocol to the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution 
Damage, London 1976 (1976 CLC Protocol); 
(b) the Protocol of 1984 to arnend the International Convention on Civil Liability for 
Oil Pollution Damage, London 1984 (1984 CLC Protocol); 
(122) the International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, Brussels 1971 (Fund Convention); 
(a) the Protocol to the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, London 1976 
(1976 Fund Protocol); and 
(b) the Protocol to amend the International Convention on the Establishment of an 
International Fund for Compensation of Oil Pollution Damage, London 1984 
(1984 Fund Protocol). 
Objectives and achievement 
The oil pollution liability regime must be seen in the context of traditional maritime 
liability Iaw regulating the relationship among different parties directly involved in maritime 
transport (e.g. ship-owners, freight-owners, ports, salvors). Maritime pollution liability relates 
maritime transport with third parties, including coastal states, which are not directly involved 
and do not directly benefü from these economic activities. 
In order to balance these interests related to maritime transport of oil and victims' 
interests, the CLC stipulates two basic objectives: (a) to ensure that adequate compensation is 
available to persons suffering from pollution damage through oil escaping during its maritime 
transport by ship, and (b) to adopt uniform regulations on liability and compensation for oil 
pollution damage (cf. prearnble). 
To meet these objectives, the Convention establishes a uniform liability regime with the 
following basic features: 
The owner of an oil tanker is liable for pollution damage caused by oil regardless of fault 
or negligence, except for some exonerations (Art. IV). The regime therefore clearly 
identifies an addressee against whom claims must be brought without, however, denying 
the owner's right of recourse under domestic Iaw (Art. III). 
The owner has to cover his liability by insurance or other financial instruments (Art. 
VII). Bankruptcy or the dissolution of the company will therefore not preclude 
compensation. 
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The owner rnay lirnit his 1iability depending upon the tonnage of the ship, but not 
exceeding the amount of 210 rnillion gold-based francs (Art. V, subsequently amended). 
In practice, the limits have been set with reference to the structure of the insurance 
market. 
The right to limit liability is based upon the establishment of a fund with a competent 
court or authority within the territory of any one of the Contracting Parties in which 
action has been brought. 
The fund is exclusively established for paying out claims in compensation for pollution 
damage occurring in the territory or territorial sea of a Contracting Party and for 
measures to prevent such damages. 
The Convention does not apply to warships and other state-"wned ships not engaged in 
commercial activities (Art. Xl). 
The 1971 Fund Convention tries to cover the remaining economic risks. Its basic 
objectives are (a) to provide for a compensation system, supplementing that of the CLC, in order 
to ensure füll compensation of victims; and (b) to distribute the economic burden between 
shipping and cargo interests (cf. preamble). 
The Fund Convention establishes an International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund: 
The Fund provides compensation up to a flat-rate ceiling to victims above the 
compensation provided under the CLC, as well as in case ship-owners are financially 
incapable to pay, or are exonerated (Art.4). 
The Fund also covers part of the liability imposed upon the ship-owner (Art. 5, later 
amended). 
Fund compensation for a single incident is limited to 950 million gold-based francs, 
including the amount paid under the CLC (later amended). 
The Fund is financed by contributions from companies ("persons") residing in the 
territory of Contracting Parties and receiving oil which has been subject to maritime 
transport. Contributions are determined in proportion to the amount of oil received above 
a specific minimum quantity which remains unassessed (Art. 10). 
The 1976 Protocols have the objective to replace the gold-based unit of accounts by 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) of the International Monetary Fund. Figures for ceilings were 
accordingly adjusted to SDR 14 million (CLC) and SDR 60 million (Fund). 
The objectives of the 1984 Protocols are (a) to draw conclusions in the context of past 
legal and Fund practice without, however, changing the principles of the existing liability and 
compensation regime; and (b) to adapt the ceilings to inflation and increased economic risks 
involved in maritime transport of oil. Ceilings were thus raised to SDR 59. 7 million for owners' 
liability under the revised CLC (Art. 6, CLC-Protocol, applicable to large tankers), and to SDR 
135 million for compensation with respect to the revised Fund (including the amount paid under 
CLC); this amount is tobe increased to SDR 200 million in case certain major contributors join 
the Fund Convention as revised by the Protocol (Art 6, Fund Protocol). The 1969 CLC and its 
1984 Protocol, as weil as the 1971 Fund Convention and its 1984 Protocol are to form single 
instruments. 
Due to the rapid growth of large-size oil tankers, the combined CLC/Fund regime did 
in fa~t reset the traditional balance between promotion of an economic activity and protection 
of third-party interests, including protection of the coastal environment, fish stocks etc. 
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The CLC achieved to a Iarge extent its objective concerning the introduction of a uniform 
regime on oil pollution liability into the body of traditional maritime law. The success of the 
uniform regime for oil pollution liability can be rneasured in terrns of participation. Following 
its entry into force in June 1975, the CLC was ratified or acceded to by 71 States14 • The 
liability regime today is accepted by rnost maritime and coastal States concerned. 
With regard to the objective to ensure adequate compensation to victims including coastal 
States, the effect of the regime is more ambiguous. At the time of its adoption, the compensation 
available under the CLC was adequate to meet the costs of oil spills. The disastrous Torrey 
Canyon casualty caused costs of about French francs 78 million, that is, well below the ceiling. 
Yet, over time the rate to which damage from major accidents could be compensated by the 
funds made available under CLC steadily decreased 15 • 
For major incidents, the International Oil Po1lution Compensation Fund provides a 
necessary supplementary compensation. The Fund Convention establishes an unprecedented 
system of compensation by which a sector of the economy has to bear its share of the economic 
burden of risks involved in maritime transport of oil. Although it had attracted considerably less 
members as compared to the CLC, the Fund Convention must be deemed to be a highly 
successful international legal instrument. Since its entry into force in October 1978, 47 countries 
joined the scheme16• Yet, due to the limitation of funds available, and due to inflation and 
increase in costs, it was not possible in any case to ensure that füll compensation was paid17• 
The 1976 Protocols, on the other hand, attracted a considerably lower rate of 
participation; the Fund Protocol (l 976) did not even come into force. But the objective of the 
Protocols has been largely met as the Special Drawing Right has replaced the former gold-based 
standard on a interim basis. 
The 1984 Protocols revise slightly the generally successful interconnected regime and try 
to solve its major drawback, namely the low fixed ceilings for compensation. However, they 
have not yet come into force. 
Participation 
The CLC (1969) is open to members of the United Nations system (UN, Specialized 
Agencies, IAEA and ICJ). Due to its provision of an additional layer of compensation, 
participation in the Fund Convention (1971) depends upon ratification of the CLC (1969). 
Accordingly, withdrawal from the CLC is considered as simultaneous withdrawal from the Fund 
Convention. 
14 Status as of 1 January 1992. 
15 Cf. OECD: Combating Oil Spills, Paris 1982. 
16 Status as of 1 January 1992. 
17 Out of about 60 cases in which the Fund has so far been involved, in one case it bad not been possible to 
fully compensate damage. A second case in which claims may exceed the ceiling is still pending. (Information 
provided by the Secretariat of the Oil Pollution Compensation Fund.) 
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The admissibility of reservations is not addressed in any of the various instruments. With 
regard to the CLC, two States (the former USSR and German Democratic Republic) submitted 
reservations concerning a general waiver of State immunity in case of oil tankers being 
commercially used but State-owned. Several States declared that they were unable to accept that 
reservation 18 • 
According to the 1976 Protocols, changing the basis of the unit of account from gold-
based franc to SDR, States that are not members of IMF can declare that they continue to use 
the gold-based franc. No State made such a declaration. No similar clauses were inserted into 
the 1984 revisions. 
Of the currently 71 Parties to the CLC (1969), 47 are developing countries (17 Asian 
[including Pacific], 11 American [including Caribbean], 16 African, and 3 European [including 
Cyprus]), and 24 industrialized countries (17 West European, 2 East European, 5 others). Of 
the 38 Parties to the 1976 CLC Protocol, which entered into force in 1981, 19 are developing 
countries (11 Asian, 4 American, 2 African, 1 European), and 19 industrialized countries (15 
West European, 2 East European and 2 others). Of the current 7 Parties to the 1984 CLC 
Protocol, which has not yet entered into force, 2 are developing countries (both from South 
America), and 5 are industrialized countries (3 West European and 2 others). 
Of the currently 47 countries that are Parties to the 1971 Fund Convention, 29 are 
developing countries (12 from Asia, 1 from America, 13 from Africa, and 3 from Europe), and 
18 industrialized countries (14 from West Europe, 2 from East Europe, and 2 others). Of the 
19 Parties to the 1976 Fund Protocol, which has not yet entered into force, 6 are developing 
countries (2 Asian, 1 American, 1 African, 2 European), and 13 industrialized countries (11 
West European, 2 East European). So far only two 2 Parties from West Europe have ratified 
the 1984 Fund Protocol which has not yet entered into force. 
Many developing and industrialized States participated in the preparation of the various 
legal instruments of the regime. The 1969 International Legal Conference on Marine Pollution 
Damage, which adopted the CLC, was attended by 48 delegations, including 21 from developing 
countries (9 from Asia, 4 from America, 6 from Africa, and 2 from Europe), and 27 from 
industrialized states (17 from Western Europe, 4 from Eastern Europe and 6 others). In addition, 
six more countries were represented by observers, including four developing countries19• The 
1971 Conference on the Fund Convention was attended by 49 delegations, of which 26 were 
from developing countries (8 from Asia, 8 from America, 8 from Africa, 2 from Europe), and 
23 from industrialized countries (16 West European, 3 East European and 4 others)20• Among 
the 69 countries represented at the 1984 Diplomatie Conference, which adopted 2 Protocols to 
amend the CLC and the Fund Convention, 43 were developing countries (11 from Asia, 16 from 
18 
No State did, however, refuse the entry into force of the Convention between itself and those having 
deposited reservations. 
19 
Figures from IMCO: Official Records of the International Legal Coriference on Marine Pollution Damage 
1969, London 1973. 
:in IMCO: Official Records of the Conference on the Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for 
Oil Pollution Damage 1971, London 1978. 
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America, 13 from Africa, and 3 from Europe) plus 2 additional observer delegations from 
developing countries, and 26 industrialized countries (16 West European, S East European, and 
5 others)21 • 
The integrated regime offers benefits for both coastal and maritime shipping States. For 
coastal States it ensures, in case of oil spills from maritime transport of oil, access to resources 
for financing preventive measures and rehabilitation of the environment, and for compensation 
of victims. Maritime States benefit from unified liability systems facilitating international 
shipping. 
Participation in the regime requires financial commitments, in the case of the CLC by 
owners of oil tankers, in the case of the Fund Convention by oil recipients. However, 
incremental costs are comparatively low. The first Director of the Fund estimated for 1980, a 
year with high damage due to oil pollution, an incremental cost of about f. 0.027013 per ton of 
crude oil and heavy fuel oil22 • Likewise, coverage of risk in terms of civil liability for pollution 
damage under the CLC is, in fact, only a small portion of total insurance costs23 • While 
adoption of the CLC results in promotion of maritime shipping, the Fund constitutes an 
insurance system as such. Participation involves regular contributions in exchange for a 
reduction of coastal States' economic risks. 
Except for general legislative and administrative capacity, neither technical nor scientific 
assistance is required to implement the Conventions. The Secretariat of the Fund offers 
assistance and information concerning the legal implementation of the regime. 
As far as participation is concerned, a number of factors are noteworthy. First, the 
liability regime focuses on damage that is geographically confined and occasionally catastrophic, 
i.e., oil spills (as compared to the quantitatively more important voluntary release of oil by 
tankers and other ships). Negotiations leading both to the 1969/1971 regime and to its 1984 
revisions were prompted by incidents that attracted major press coverage, i.e., the 1967 Torrey 
Canyon accident, and the 1978 Amoco Cadiz accident. 
The regime is of particular importance to a globall y trading industry, i. e., maritime 
carriage of oil. The industry, through the International Maritime Committee (CMI), played an 
active role in the preparation of the CLC and its 1984 revision. Since the CMI is made up of 
national committees, and members of national committees also participated in several delegations 
during the negotiations, it may be assumed that the shipping industry also influenced the decision 
and implementation process at the domestic level in several countries. 
The influence of the oil processing industry is also relevant. Oil companies, organized 
in the Oil Companies' International Marine Forum (OCIMF), have generally accepted to bear 
21 IMO: International Conference on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connexion with the Carriage 
of Certain Substances by Sea 1984, Final Act. 
22 Reinhard Ganten: International System for Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, Oslo 1981, p. 17. 
23 Henri Smets: Oil Spill Risk: Economic Assessment and Compensation Limit, 14 Journal of Maritime Law 
and Commerce 1983, p. 33, gives the following rates for a typical West European supertanker on a Gulf-Rotterdam 
itinerary: 7 Ffrs./DWT (Dead Weight Ton) for the hull; 7 Ffrs./DWT for the cargo; and 1,2 Ffrs./DWT for civil 
liability, 10% of which accounting for oil pollution damage. Doubling the latter portion would therefore increase 
insurance costs of 15,6 Ffrs by another 0, 16 Ffrs. 
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a share of economic risks in order to avoid the negative implications of unilateral measures for 
the business of large-scale maritime transport of oil. During the period of inter-governmental 
negotiations establishing the CLC, they adopted in 1968 the "Tanker Owners Voluntary 
Agreement Concerning Liability for Oil Pollution" (TOV ALOP) which provides for owners' 
liability parallel to that under the CLC. TOVALOP entered into force in 1969 and within a short 
period of time covered nearly 90% of the world tanker fleet. Likewise, during the negotiations 
on the Fund-Convention, companies adopted the "Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to 
Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution" (CRISTAL) which is similar to the Fund and provides 
compensation supplementary to TOV ALOP. Like the Fund, CRISTAL is financed by cargo 
interests. Both voluntary agreements have been revised and adapted to their intergovernmental 
corollaries. The revised agreements apply regardless of whether or not the CLC or the Fund 
Convention apply to the incident. TOVALOP applies virtually to all tankers, CRISTAL covers 
approximately 80% of all cargoes of oil carried by sea24 • 
As to reservations, the 1976 Protocols stipulate that Parties that are not members of the 
IMF may declare that they continue to use the gold-based unit of account. This clause is of 
interest predominantly for East-European countries. Yet, the clause was never used and did not 
gain practical relevance for the regime. 
Implementation and information 
The CLC and its 1976 Protocol entered into force after ratification, accession or approval 
by 8 States, including 5 States having at least one million units of gross tanker tonnage. The 
CLC came into force in June 1975 for 14 Parties, almost six years after its adoption; the 
tonnage requirement clearly delayed entry into force. Likewise, the 1976 Protocol to the CLC 
entered into force in April 1981 for 9 Parties; here again, the tonnage requirement was a 
constraint. The 1984 Protocol to the CLC increased minimum requirements to 10 ratifications, 
including 6 by States having at least a million units of gross tanker tonnage. However, since one 
of the objectives of the CLC is to provide uniform law, not least to avoid competitive 
disadvantages to early participants, such a requirement covering ratifi.cations and tanker tonnage 
appears appropriate. 
The Fund Convention and its 1976 Protocol were to enter into force after ratification, 
accession or approval by at least 8 states, and a minimum representation of 750 million tons of 
contributing oil. Moreover, the Fund Convention was not to enter into force prior to entry into 
force of the CLC. While the Convention entered into force for 15 Parties almost seven years 
after its adoption in October 1978, the 1976 Fund Protocol, with currently 19 ratifications, has 
not been able to secure the requirement as these Parties represent only approximately two-thirds 
of the amount of contributing oil required. In both cases, the minimum requirement conceming 
provisions of oil has considerably constrained entry into force. 
Since the Fundis principally an insurance pool, a minimum of contributing oil appears 
to be essential for its operation, because it ensures a minimum distribution of risks. After all, 
the Fund Convention provides a limit for compensation for each single incident but the actual 
24 
Copies of TOV ALOP and CRIST AL may be obtained from the International Tanker Owners Pollution 
Federation, London. 
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amount of annual contributions is not limited as it depends on the number and gravity of 
incidents which have to be compensated. 
The 1984 Fund Protocol provides rules for accelerated entry into force, i.e., eight 
ratifications, accessions or approvals representing 600 million tons of contributing oil. However, 
Parties may declare that participation wi\1 become effective only upon joint withdrawal from the 
CLC (1969) and Fund ( 1971) Conventions as soon as at least 750 million tons of contributing 
oil are represented. Moreover, the Fund Protocol of 1984 shall not enter into force prior to the 
entry into force of the CLC Protocol of 1984. 
The requirement to pay high initial contributions immediately upon ratification, which 
may have been an obstacle to early ratification25 , was dropped. Moreover, entry into force was 
implicitly eased by another provision which is not part of the final clauses. The Fund (1984) 
enters into force with a compensation limit of SDR 135 m. In case, however, that three member 
States combine 600 million tons of contributing oil, the limit automatically increases to SDR 200 
million. In practice, the fulfillment of this condition depends upon participation by the USA 
(either in combination with Japan, or with Italy and France, or with Italy and the 
Netherlands)26 • The Fund may enter into force without participation by the USA, but it will 
only operate to full capacity upon participation by the largest consumer of oil carried by sea. 
The CLC establishes a civil liability regime for oil pollution damage. The main 
commitment imposed on Contracting States is to implernent the regirne in domestic law, while 
actual liability arises exclusively for owners of oil tankers. Contracting States have to perform 
some auxiliary duties. They shall ensure that competent authorities attest and certify that ship 
owners cover oil pollution risks by appropriate insurance. They shall mutually accept certificates 
issued by Contracting States. They shall ensure that oil tankers, wherever registered (e.g. in 
non-contracting states), do not enter or leave ports or offshore installations situated in their 
territory or territorial sea without such a certificate. Parties shall ensure that courts have the 
necessary competences, and they sha11 recognize judgements of courts competent under the 
Convention. Finally, Contracting Parties shall waive immunity with regard to ships that are 
State-owned but involved in commercial trading. The 1984 CLC Protocol does not impose any 
substantially different cornmitments upon Parties. 
Institutionalized monitoring of the irnplementation of these.duties or reporting obligations 
do not exist. However, the cost-effective part of the CLC liability regirne, the coverage of 
economic risk by insurance, is subject to decentralized control by port States. 
The Fund Convention imposes on Contracting Parties primarily the obligation to 
implement the rules concerning contributions to the Fund into domestic law. States do not 
guarantee contributions; and normally they do not contribute. But they shall ensure that 
contributions are paid, e.g., by imposing sanctions. They shall ensure that the Fund is 
recognized as a legal person entitled to sue oil-receiving persons. They shall ensure that the 
Fund has a right to intervene in case of Fund incidents in legal proceedings concerning CLC 
25 Cf. Reinhard Ganten: Oil Pollution Liability. Amen<lments A<lopte<l to Civil Liability and Fund Conventions; 
2 Oil & Petrochemical Pollution 1985, p. 102. 
26 Cf. Reinhard Ganten: Oil Pollution Liability. Amendments Adopted to Civil Liability and Fund Conventions; 
2 Oil & Petrochemica1Pollution1985, p. JOO and note 30. 
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liability, since judgements on CLC liability may have an impact on additional Fund 
compensation. In case Contracting Parties declare that they will contribute in the place of their 
nationals, they have to waive their immunity in that respect. Finally, Parties shall communicate 
annually a list of oil-receiving persons under their jurisdiction and the amount of oil received 
by each person. Although this !ist is indispensable for the assessment of contributions by the 
Fund Secretariat, late submission was frequent during the initial period. The 1984 Fund Protocol 
provides for a modest sanctioning mechanism, as it holds States liable for any financial losses 
of the Fund due to late submission of their annual lists. Apart from this slight modification, the 
1984 Protocol does not impose any substantially different commitments upon States. 
Like the CLC, the Fund Convention does not provide for organized monitoring of 
implementation. However, the most cost-effective part of obligations, i.e., regular contributions 
on the part of persons receiving oil above a certain quantity, as well as the only regular 
obligation of Contracting States, i.e. the annual submission of lists of contributing persons, are 
closely monitored by the Fund Secretariat. Moreover, the Fund Secretariat is fairly well 
informed about relevant national law and maintains close informal relations with administrative 
units of Contracting Parties that are responsible for implementation of the regime. As a 
consequence, the implementation process is promoted by informal consultations. So far, the 
Fund did not have to sue any non-contributing, financially capable person. The Assembly of 
Contracting Parties to the Fund Convention does not play a major role in the promotion of 
implemen tation. 
Once the decision to join one or more of the instruments of the CLC/Fund regime is 
taken, implementation generally does not seem to have raised major problems. This may be due 
to the fact that the cost-effective parts of commitments are to some degree self-enforcing and 
removed from the intergovernmental level. Also, the Secretariat also provides training and 
assistance for implementation, especially for developing countries. 
The IMO (former IMCO) Secretariat publishes Final Acts of diplomatic conferences. 
Texts of agreements are disseminated primarily in English and French. Since international 
conventions on maritime law are frequently used in legal proceedings, the International Maritime 
Organization published the Official Records of the Diplomatie Conferences of 1969 (CLC) and 
1971 (Fund Convention) in English. Fund practice is reported to the biennial meetings of the 
Assembly of Contracting Parties. The Fund Secretariat has issued a number of papers facilitating 
implementation of the regime and the submission of claims, including a non-technical "Claims 
Manual" for the information of victims about claims procedures, etc. For a broader public, 
current developments are reported in regular IMO publications (e.g., IMO Newspaper). 
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Operation, review and adjustment 
The Secretary-General of IMO (former IMCO) perforrns depositary functions for both 
the CLC and the Fund Conventions. 
Except for a decentralized port State control systern, the CLC does not have its own 
institutional apparatus, e.g. a regular conference of Parties. Commitrnents are not regularly 
reviewecl. However, IMO, as depositary organization, shall convene a conference of Contracting 
Parties if so desirecl by at least one-third of the Parties. Such a conference was callecl twice for 
the adoption of Protocols: in 1976 and in 1984. In fact, the IMO Legal Cornrnittee, initially 
establishecl as an ad hoc forum for the preparation of CLC and Fund Conventions, has assurnecl 
the role of a deliberation forurn, responsible for general supervision and review of the CLC. 
The 1984 Protocol designates the IMO Legal Committee, expandecl by those Contracting 
Parties that are not rnembers of IMO, as a forum for discussion and decision-rnaking about 
amendments of lirnitation amounts according to sirnplified procedures. Because IMO provides 
the deliberation forum and the necessary servicing functions, separate secretariat and 
administrative costs do not arise under the CLC. 
By contrast, the Fund Convention established a comprehensive institutional apparatus. 
A secretariat, led by the Fund Director, is responsible for the conduct of business, including 
collection of contributions and rnost final settlements. The 1971 Fund Convention establishes two 
decision-making bodies, the Assembly of Contracting Parties which rneets annually, and the 
Executive Comrnittee comprising one third of Parties and meeting at least annually. However, 
because of annual rotation in membership of the Executive Comrnittee, the supervisory structure 
did not work satisfactorily. U nder the 1984 Protocol, the Executive Committee is not re-
establishecl. Instead, the Assembly as the principal policy-making body controls the Fund and 
its Secretariat and may establish technical working groups for the supervision of financial 
settlements for particular incidents27 • 
Despite regular meetings of the Assembly of Parties, arnendments of compensation limits 
according to simplified procedures under the 1984 Fund Protocol are to be deliberated and 
decidecl within the IMO Legal Cornmittee in order to co-ordinate changes in the limitation 
amounts of both Conventions by a single decision-rnaking body. 
Annual Secretariat costs amount to f 500,000 - 600,000. Expenses are paid from the 
Fund, i.e., by contributing persons and not by Contracting States. Expenses for delegations, 
travel etc. are paid by Contracting Parties. 
The CLC/Fund regime has no system or rules by which scientific and technical 
knowleclge are incorporated into the decision-making process. As the regime is primarily 
concerned with allocation of economic risks involved in maritime transportation of oil, the input 
of scientific and technical knowledge plays a minor role in the decision-rnaking process. 
The Fund Secretariat, the Assembly and the Executive Committee, all play a role in the 
evolution of the legal regirne. In particular, financial settlernents provide some "case law" as 
to the authoritative interpretation of the two conventions. 
27 On the reasons for this revision, see Reinhard Ganten: Oil Pollution Liability. Assessment of Possible 
Revisions; Oil & Petrochemical Pollution 1983, pp. 21-22. 
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Limitation amounts have to be regu1arly adapted to increasing risks and inflation. The 
1969 CLC does not contain any provision in this regard. The 1971 Fund Convention allows an 
increase of compensation limits up to 100% by Assembly decision. In 1979, following the 
Amoco Cadiz accident, the Assembly increased the limit by 50% (from SDR 30 to SDR 45 
million), in 1987 up to the limit of SDR 60 million. In both 1984 Protocols, provision is made 
for a simplified amendment procedure concerning limitation amounts that is applicable under 
several restrictions. Amendments are deliberated within the IMO Legal Committee and decided 
upon by a two-thirds majority of Parties. Amendments enter into force after a period of 18 
months unless at least one quarter of Parties submit objections within that period. Amendments 
adopted under this procedure are binding upon all Parties. 
Codification programming 
With regard to liability for damage caused by maritime transportation of oil, no revisions 
beyond the 1984 Protocols are currently pending. However, preparations for a separate 
Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connexion with the Carriage of Noxious and 
Hazardous Substances by Sea (HNS Convention) have been resumed within IMO. 
Work in the two fields of liability for pollution caused by maritime carriage of dangerous 
substances proceeds within the Legal Committee of IMO. Co-ordination is thus facilitated by the 
uniformity of the negotiation forum. Co-ordination of the HNS project negotiated within IMO 
with its corollary addressing liability for damage during inland transport of dangerous substances 
negotiated within ECE (No. 124 below) has been accomplished by avoidance of simultaneous 
preparation of instruments. When adoption of the Draft HNS Convention failed in 1984, the 
project was abandoned until the ECE corollary was virtually finalized. 
With respect to liability for damage from maritime carriage of dangerous substances, the 
HNS Convention under consideration will bridge a major gap existing in international maritime 
law on third party liability. As far as damage from maritime carriage of oil is concemed, some 
risks remain uncovered by the CLC/Fund regime, including damage other than pollution 
damage, e.g., resulting from explosion of tankers, and oil pollution damage from unidentified 
sources, e.g., caused by deliberate release of oil residues. Finally, if the oil business is 
considered as an integrated industry, risks of oil pollution and other damage not arising from 
maritime carriage of oil, but e.g., from offshore operations, are not yet covered by globally 
applicable international regulations on liability (see No. 123 below). 
International law concerning liability for oil pollution damage arising from maritime 
~arriage of oil has been developed in close collaboration with major oil companies. lt has been 
mfluenced by T<?V ALOP _and CR IST AL, the voluntary Iiability and compensation contracts 
agr~ u?on by 011 compames. The CLC/Fund legal regime is continuously developed by Fund 
practice m respect of the settlement of claims, and through joint authoritative interpretation by 
the Fund Assembly. 
III. Civil Liability for Pollution Damage Caused 
by Offshore Operations 
423 
(123) Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting from Exploration for 
and Exploitation of Seabed Mineral Resources, London 1977. 
Objectives and achievement 
The major oil spill off the coast of Santa Barbara, California, in 1972 and the beginning 
exploitation of oil resources in the North Sea continental shelf area brought attention to the 
importance of large-scale accidental oil spills caused by offshore operations. Responding to this 
development, the regional London Convention concerning offshore operations pursues two 
objectives: (a) to ensure that adequate compensation is available for victims of oil pollution from 
offshore operations, and (b) to provide uniform ru1es and procedures for determining questions 
of liability and compensation (preamble). The Convention establishes the following regime: 
Operators shall be strictly liable for oil pollution damage caused by offshore installations 
and for costs of measures for the prevention of such darnage (Art. 3); they shall have a 
right of recourse according to national law. 
Liability shall be limited per incident to SDR 30 rnillion; this amount shall automatically 
increase to SDR 40 rnillion after a period of five years from the opening of the 
instrument for signature (Art. 6). 
Liability shall be covered by insurance or financial security up to SDR 22 rnillion, to be 
increased autornatically to SDR 35 million after the same five year period (Art. 8). These 
amounts seemed to be the limits for which insurance cover was obtainable. 
In case of an accident, legal action shall be brought in courts of any Contracting State 
in which damage occurred or of the licensing State. The operator shall establish a 
limitation fund in one of these courts which shall, in turn, be competent to decide on 
matters of compensation (Art. 11). 
Contracting Parties may provide for higher limits or unlimited liability (Art. 15). 
The Convention intends to rnake operators liable for dangerous, but generally beneficial 
commercial activities involving economic risks. lt thus directly integrates industrial development 
and environmental aspects. 
The territorial applicability of the Convention is restricted to the areas of the North Sea, 
the Baltic Sea and the North Atlantic, adjacent to the European coastline. Although the 
Convention does not have an immediate bearing on global environmental protection and 
sustainable development, it is apt to serve as a precedent for the negotiation of similar liability 
regimes balancing developmental and environmental aspects of dangerous activities in offshore 
areas of other regions or regional seas. Since the Convention focuses exclusively on Western 
Europe, it does not take into account the special situation of developing countries. 
If achievement is measured in terrns of the number of States which have ratified the 
Convention and implemented the regime, the Convention did not achieve its objectives; it did 
not receive any ratification so far. Nevertheless, the negotiation process caused the establishment 
of a voluntary compensation scheme by oil companies involved in North Sea offshore operations 
("Oil Pollution Liability Agreement", OPOL) providing, in its current version, for compensation 
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up to US$ 100 million28 • In connection wi th domestic Jaws of 1iability, OPOL provides a better 
claims situation for victims than the Convention would have done. Hence, while the Convention 
has not met its objective of providing uniform mies and procedures, it has, in an indirect way, 
ensured the availability of adequate compensation for victims. 
Participation 
The Convention is restricted to the group of countries having been invited to the Inter-
governmental Conference which adopted the Convention. The Conference was attended by nine 
West-European States. The Contracting Parties may, however, by unanimous agreement invite 
other States having coastlines on the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, or the Atlantic Ocean north of 
36°N (i.e., European coastlines). 
No reservations may be made under the Convention. 
The major reason for non-ratification by interested countries has been the existence of 
the above-mentioned Oil Pollution Liability Agreement. 
Implementation and information 
The Convention requires four ratifications to enter into force. The principal commitment 
imposed on Parties is domestic legal implementation of the regime set out in the Convention. 
This commitment includes provision of necessary jurisdictional competences and waiving of 
immunities in case of a State Party itself being operator of offshore activities. No obligations 
exist as to reporting or data supply. Implementation has to be monitored decentralized, that is, 
by Parties and NGOs, e.g., oil companies concerned. 
The Convention does not contain any provision addressing the promotion of 
implementation or dispute settlernent. 
The United Kingdom Government published the Convention and the Final Act of the 
1977 Diplomatie Conference in English. 
Operation, review and adjustment 
The Government of the United Kingdom performs depositary functions. There are no 
institutional arrangements as to the establishment of a secretariat or regular meetings. 
While mechanisms for regular review of provisions do not exist, the Convention sets out 
a mechanism for accelerated adaptation of limitation figures. Under the Convention a Committee 
composed of one representative of each Contracting Party is established and shall be convened 
if a Party considers lirnitation tigures no longer adequate. The Committee may, by a majority 
of three-quarters of the Parties, adopt a recomrnendation on the modification of these figures. 
F~gu.res .recommended enter into force upon acceptance by aJl Parties. Parties not responding 
w1thm s1x months are deemed to have accepted the modification. lf a Party objects within six 
months, amounts recommended shall enter into force for all other Parties. 
28 
Copies may be obtained from The Offshore Pollution Liability Limited, Ewell, Surrey, United Kingdom. 
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Codification programming 
At present no specific draft revisions or new draft instruments are discussed, although 
some States concerned closely monitor the situation with a view to revising the Convention in 
terms of imposing unlimited and strict llability of operators. 
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IV. Civil Liability for Damage Caused by Inland 
Transport of Dangerous Substances 
(124) Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous 
Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation Vessels (CRTD), Geneva 1989. 
Objectives and achievement 
The Convention covers risks involved in inland transport of dangerous goods. The 
objective of the Convention is to establish uniform rules ensuring adequate and speedy 
compensation for damage during inland carriage of dangerous goods (preamble). lt creates the 
following liability regime: 
The carrier, i.e., the registered owner or other person controlling a road vehicle or an 
inland navigation vessel or the operator of a railway line, is liable for damage caused 
during transport of dangerous goods (Art. 5). Damage extends to loss of life or personal 
injury, loss or damage of property, loss or damage by contamination to the environment, 
including reasonable measures for the reinstatement of the environment, and the costs of 
preventive measures (Art. 1). 
The carrier's liability shall be covered by insurance or financial security (Art. 13), except 
that carriers being States or their constituting parts do not require insurance cover (Art. 
16). 
The carrier may limit his liability per incident, in case of a road or rail carrier to SDR 
18 million for claims concerning loss of life or personal injury and to SDR 12 million 
with respect to other claims, and in the case of inland navigation vessels to SDR 8 
rnillion and SDR 7 million respective!y (Art. 9). 
No clairn may be made beyond the regime against the carrier or any person engaged in 
the transport operation or in related salvage activities (Art. 5). 
Action may be brought in courts of Contracting Parties in which either the incident has 
occurred, or damage was sustained, or preventive measures were undertaken, or the 
carrier has his habitual residence (Art. 19). The carrier may establish a limitation fund 
in one of the courts where action has been brought. The court at which the fund has been 
established will be responsible to decide about distribution of compensation. 
The Convention intends to integrate development and environment by balancing the 
prerequisites of a generally benign activity, i.e. transportation of dangerous substances, and its 
adverse effects and inherent economic risks of causing damage to the environment and to third 
parties. 
The Convention refers to locally confined incidents of accidental damage. Even though 
it was prepared under the auspices of the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), its 
possible impact is not limited regionally. lt may be joined by States beyond the membership of 
ECE and it may serve as a precedent for conclusion of similar agreements applicable to other 
regions, although the principal territorial focus is Europe and some neighboring States . 
. The Convention does not specifically take into account the circumstances of developing 
countnes. 
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Since the Convention was adopted only in October 1989, little can be said about the 
degree of achieving its objectives. However, its success may be measured both in terms of the 
number of States accepting and implementing the regime, and in terms of the amount of 
compensation available under the Convention as compared to the costs caused by incidents. 
Participation 
Although adopted in a regional forum (ECE), membership is open to all States. 
Reservations may be made on three specified points relating to higher standards for the 
protection of victims. Reservations other than those specified are not possible. 
The Convention has not yet entered into force. While two countries, including one non-
European developing country, have signed the Convention, no instrument of ratification has been 
submitted so far. 
The Convention was drafted by the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
Law (UNIDROIT) and negotiated within the Inland Transport Committee of ECE. These fora 
generally address a European membership. There are no particular incentives for the 
encouragement of participation by developing countries. Measures for the promotion of 
participation by developing countries have not been 
adopted. 
Implementation and information 
The Convention enters into force after five instruments of ratification, approval, 
acceptance or accession have been deposited. 
Parties are primarily under the obligation to implement the legal regime set out in the 
Convention. It includes the necessary jurisdictional competences, the designation of one or more 
authorities for issuing certificates of insurance, the designation of the authority for issuing or 
receiving communications related to compulsory insurance, the waiving of immunity in case a 
State or constituting part thereof is a carrier. 
The Convention does not require Parties to regularly report implementation or supply and 
disclose data. However, Parties having made reservations to the Convention shall notify the 
depositary of the contents of their national law. 
No mention is made in the Convention of measures to enhance compliance, of reactions 
to non-compliance, or of the settlement of disputes. 
The Convention has been disseminated by ECE as a UN document in English, French 
and Russian. Publication of the Convention was accompanied by an explanatory report providing 
guidance for the interpretation and implementation of the regime. 
Operation, review and adjustment 
Depositary functions under the Convention are performed by the Secretary General of 
the United Nations. The Convention does not provide for the establishment of a separate 
institutional mechanism. However, the Inland Transport Committee of ECE provides the 
standing forum for deliberations in matters concerning the Convention. Upon request of one 
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third of, but at least three Parties, the Inland Transport Committee shall convene a Conference 
of Parties for revising or amending the Convention. Moreover, the Inland Transport Committee 
shall convene, upon request of one quarter of, but at least three Parties, a Committee constituted 
of one representative from each Contracting Party for amending compensation amounts 
according to simplified amendment procedures. 
The Convention does not provide for regular meetings or programme activities, nor for 
a secretariat. 
There are no mechanisms for regular or periodic review of the regime. Nevertheless, the 
Convention provides for simplified procedures for amendment of compensation figures. Requests 
for such amendments shall be supported by one quarter of, but at least three Parties. Requests 
are considered by the Committee of the Parties which adopts amendments of limitation figures 
by a two-thirds majority. An amendment is deemed to have been accepted if within a period of 
18 months not at least a quarter of Parties has communicated its non-acceptance. Amendments 
accepted are binding for all Parties. In deciding, the Committee shall take into account past 
experience with incidents, changes in monetary value, and the anticipated impact of an 
amendment on insurance costs. 
Codification programming 
No drafts or draft revisions are currently under consideration with regard to inland 
transport of dangerous substances. A related instrument addressing liability for damage from 
maritime transport of dangerous substances is currently being prepared within IMO (see section 
II above), and an instrument addressing liability for dangerous activities is under consideration 
within the Council of Europe. 
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V. Other Developments Concerning Liability for Environmental Damage 
Apart from the above-mentioned projects concerning liability for hazardous activities 
referring to maritime carriage of noxious and hazardous substances (IMO) and nuclear damage 
(IAEA), a number of other specific liability regimes are currently under preparation. 
1. Liability for environmental damage in the framework of comprehensive instruments 
Preparation of detailed rules on liability for environmental damage is being considered, 
or such rules are currently being prepared, as part of several comprehensive international treaty 
systems addressing specific hazardous activities: 
Within the framework of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), a 
protocol on liability and compensation for damage resulting from the transboundary 
movement and disposal of hazardous wastes, to supplement the 1989 Basel Convention 
on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal 
(No. 103), is being negotiated. An Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical 
Experts has elaborated some "elements for a protocol" to be submitted to the first 
meeting of the Contracting Parties to the Convention. The meeting will be convened upon 
entry into force of the Convention which is expected to take place in 1992. The purpose 
of the draft protocol is to provide a comprehensive regime to ensure adequate and prompt 
compensation for damage from transboundary movement and disposal of hazardous 
wastes and other wastes, to deter violations of the Basel Convention and to enable 
restoration of the environment. The "elements" suggest to supplement private liability of 
Operators either by an international fund, or by state Iiability, or by a combination of 
both concepts. Drafting is tobe closely co-ordinated with the Draft Convention on Civil 
Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, which is 
currently under preparation in the Council of Europe (see below). lt should also be 
coordinated with any future regulations on liability for damage from ocean dumping 
within the framework of the 1972 London Convention on the Prevention of Marine 
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter (No. 35). Consideration of such 
regulations, however, have been postponed for the time being (see below). 
Within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty System (No. 14), the 1991 Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty, envisages the development of and 
annex on "rules and procedures relating to Iiability for damage arising from activities 
talGng place in the Antarctic Treaty area and covered by this Protocol"29 
No further action has been taken so far. 
Within the framework of IMO, the question has been raised whether to prepare an 
instrument on liability for damage arising from ocean dumping of wastes, supplementing 
the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other 
Matter, London 1972 (No. 35). Drafting has been postponed in order to facilitate co-
ordination with two other projects addressing matters of liability for damage from waste 
management, i.e., the above-mentioned UNEP Protocol on Liability and Compensation 
29 Article 16, as adopted in Madrid on 4 October 1991. 
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for Damage Resulting from the Transboundary Movement and Disposal of Hazardous 
Wastes and the Draft Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities 
Dangerous to the Environment (Council of Europe, see below). 
Within the framework of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (No. 38), the 
Preparatory Commission for the International Sea-Bed Authority and the International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea drafts specific rules on liability for damage caused by 
deep sea-bed mining activities, as part of a comprehensive set of Draft Regulations on 
the Protection and Preservation of the Marine Environment from Activities in the Area. 
2. Liability for dangerous activities (Council of Europe) 
Responding to the "Sandoz" incident which heavily polluted the Rhine River, a Draft 
Convention on Civil Liabi1ity for Damage Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the 
Environment is currently being prepared within the Council of Europe. The draft elaborated by 
a Committee of Experts has been published in July 1991 with a view to organizing consultations 
with interested (e.g., non-governmental) actors. The project is regional in scope. Its objective 
is to ensure adequate compensation and to provide means for the prevention of damage and the 
reinstitution of the environment. lt channels liability to the operator of a dangerous activity and 
provides for some institutional arrangements, including a Standing Committee. The Draft 
Convention addresses a broad range of dangerous activities, including the production and 
handling of dangerous substances and genetically modified organisms or dangerous micro-
organisms, technologies producing dangerous non-ionising radiations, the incineration, handling, 
treatment or recycling of wastes, and the operation of sites for the permanent disposal of wastes. 
Drafting has to be closely co-ordinated with all existing liability regimes and current 
developments in various areas of liability for environmental damage, including liability for 
nuclear damage (OECD/NEA, IAEA), maritime carriage of dangerous substances and oil (IMO), 
inland carriage of dangerous substances (ECE), and transboundary movement and disposal of 
hazardous wastes and other wastes (UNEP). 
3. International liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts not prohibited 
by international law (International Law Commission) 
The most comprehensive, and therefore most general, project is currently under 
discussion in the UN International Law Commission (ILC). While its primary focus is on 
international, i.e., inter-governmental, liability for activities involving risks and activities with 
harmful effects, it recently extended to civil liability matters as well. 
As the project extends to dangerous activities for which liability conventions are existing 
or under preparation, drafting has to be coordinated with developments conceming all other 
liability regimes now in the process of drafting. While there have been some co-ordinating 
efforts with regard to law-making projects under preparation within IAEA and the Council of 
Europe, the special rapporteur of the project was (as Chairman) personally involved in the 
UNEP Ad Hoc Working Group of Legal and Technical Experts for the elaboration of elements 
to be included in a Protocol on Liability and Compensation for Damage Resulting from the 
Transboundary Movement and Disposal of Hazardous Wastes and other Wastes. Co-ordination 
basically depends upon members of the ILC, in particular upon the special rapporteur, and on 
the annual deliberations in the Sixth Committee of the UN General Assembly to which the 
Commission annually reports. 
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STATUS OF RATIFICATIONS AS OF 1JANUARY1992 
GLOBAL INSTRUMENTS (Treaty numbers see page 392) 
1 Parties 1118 1119 1120 1121 1 122 1 
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria X X 
Angola 
Antigua & Barbuda 
Argentina X X 
Australia X 
Austria 
Bahamas X X 
Bahrain 
Bangladesh 
Barbados 
Belarus* 
Belgium X X 
Belize X 
Ben in X X 
Bhutan 
Bolivia X 
Botswana 
Brazil X 
Brunei Darussalam 
Bulgaria 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Cambodia 
Cameroon X X X 
Canada X X 
Cape Verde 
Central African Republic 
Ch ad 
Chile X X 
China X 
Colombia X 
Cook Islands 
Comoros 
Congo 
Costa Rica 
Cote d'Ivoire X X 
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Parties 118 119 120 121 122 
Cuba X 
Cyprus X X 
Czech & Slovak Fed. Rep. 
Democr. People's Rep. of Korea 
Denmark X X X 
Djibouti X X 
Dominica 
Dominican Republ ic X 
Ecuador X 
Egypt X X 
EI Salvador 
Equatorial Guinea 
Estonia* 
Ethiopia 
Fiji X X 
Finland X X X 
France X X X 
Gabon X X X 
Gambia X X 
Germany X X X 
Ghana X X 
Greece X X 
Grenada 
Guatemala X 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
Guyana 
Haiti 
Holy See 
Honduras 
Hungary X 
Iceland X X 
India X X 
Indonesia X X 
Iran (Islamic Republic of) 
Iraq 
Ireland 
Israel 
Italy X X X 
Jamaica 
Japan X X 
Status of Ratifications 433 
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Jordan 
Kenya 
Kiribati 
Kuwait X X 
Lao People's Democratic Rep. 
Latvia* 
Lebanon X X 
Lesotho 
Liberia X X X 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Liechtenstein 
Lithuania* 
Luxembourg X 
Madagascar X 
Malawi 
Malaysia 
Maldives X X 
Mali 
Malta X X 
Marshall Islands 
Mauritania 
Mauritius 
Mexico X 
Micronesia 
Monaco X X 
Mongolia 
Morocco X 
Mozambique 
Myanmar 
Namibia 
Nauru 
Nepal 
Netherlands X X X X 
New Zealand X 
Nicaragua 
Niger X 
Nigeria X X 
Niue 
Norway X X X 
Oman X X 
Pakistan 
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1 Parties 1 118 1 119 1 120 1 121 1 122 1 
Palau 
Panama X 
Papua New Guinea X X 
Paraguay 
Peru X X 
Philippines X 
Po land X X X 
Portugal X X X 
Qatar X X 
Republic of Korea X 
Republic of Yemen X X 
Romania 
Rwanda 
St. Kitts & Nevis 
St. Lucia 
St. Vincent & the Grenadines X 
Samoa 
San Marino 
Sao Tome & Principe 
Saudi Arabia 
Senegal X 
Seychelles X X 
Sierra Leone 
Singapore X 
Solomon Islands 
Somalia 
South Africa X 
Spain X X X 
Sri Lanka X X 
Sudan 
Suriname X 
Swaziland 
Sweden X X X 
Switzerland X 
Syrian Arab Republic X X X 
Thailand 
Togo 
Tonga 
Trinidad & Tobago X 
Tunisia X X 
Turkey 
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Tuvalu X X 
Uganda 
Ukraine* 
Union of Soviet Socialist Rep. * X X 
United Arab Emirates X X 
United Kingdom X X 
United Republic of Tanzania 
United States of America 
Uruguay 
Vanuatu X X 
Venezuela 
Viet Nam 
Yugoslavia" X X X 
Zaire X 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
* Membership status subject to further clarification. 
REGIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
(93) Convention on Third Party Liahility in the Field of Nuclear Energy (Paris 1960) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Turkey 
United Kingdom 
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